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Leveraged ETFs Performance During Financial Crisis 




Shuvojit Paul  
 
This paper seeks to evaluate the performance of Leveraged ETFs during the 
financial crisis. The paper is based on the performance analysis of three 2x bull 
and 2x bear Exchange Traded Fund respectively traded in the US and Canada. 
Leveraged ETFs have received much press coverage lately because of their 
performance related issues. Most of the discussion related to the leveraged ETFs 
has been focused towards the compounding effect, when funds are held for more 
than one day. 
 
In this paper I have desegregated the effect of compounding and that of i) the 
management of the fund and ii) the trading premiums/discounts, all of which 
affect investors‘ returns. The former (i) is influenced by the effectiveness of the 
manager‘s replication strategy and the cost of leverage. The latter (ii) reflects 
liquidity and the efficiency of the market. I find that tracking errors were not 
caused by the effects of compounding alone. Depending on the fund, the impact 
of management factors can outweigh the impact of compounding, and substantial 
premiums/discounts caused by reduced liquidity during the financial crisis further 
distorted performance. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Buy index funds and ETFs. That might not seem like enough action to a 25-
year-old, but it's the smartest thing to do.” - Charles R. Schwab, founder and 
former CEO of the Charles Schwab Corporation 
 
Exchange Traded Funds (hereafter ETFs) are one the recent developments that 
occurred in the financial world and they have gained popularity among the big 
institutional investors in the last decades. The idea of mimicking the whole index 
has been generated by the invention of mutual funds. But the ETFs create a 
different dimension by including characteristics such as liquidity and the ability to 
trade like normal stocks in the exchange compared to the characteristics of 
mutual funds.  
 
The main idea behind the development of ETFs was to trade an entire portfolio in 
a single transaction. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when program trading 
made it possible to trade bundles of different stocks, ETFs got their first 
development and breakthroughs. Subsequently, futures products on whole 
indices (e.g. S&P 500 Index) were launched until the regulatory bodies (i.e. 
CFTC) claimed that these products should not trade on a stock exchange. 
Leveraged ETFs are one of the few ETFs products that have gained much of 
investors‘ attention and have performed better than most of its class of products 




The objective of this paper is to highlight the performance of only leveraged ETFs 
during the financial crisis and breaking down the performance measure in order 
to provide more in depth knowledge of its better performances during the 




The 2007/2008 financial crisis that culminated in the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, a US investment bank, has had pronounced repercussions in almost all 
areas of financial markets. While the crisis was started from mortgage backed 
securities initially and later spread towards the credit markets in general, later 
almost all asset classes were affected. In short the financial world suffered from 
the catastrophe which has not seen since the 1930‘s. Arnott and West (2008) 
have reported that all of the asset classes were badly affected in September 
2008. The downturn of the financial crisis has been observed in developed and 
emerging equity markets, corporate bond markets, real estate, commodities and 
hedge funds as they have endured significant losses during that tenure. Asset 
under management (AUM) have diminished as well due to the decline of asset 
prices across all the asset class and a significant amount of withdrawals by the 
hedge fund and mutual fund investors during the last quarter of 2008 (IMF, 2008) 
have led to a further decline of the total AUM during that year.  
 
Surprisingly exchange traded funds (ETFs) were one of the few financial 
products that stood out by not being hit as hard as other asset classes during the 
3 
 
financial crisis. They gained popularity in large number thereafter. For instance, 
European mutual funds suffered outflows of USD 570 billion over the course of 
2008. ETFs, by contrast, collected USD 74 billion (Fuhr, 2009). In 2012 ETFs 
had a record high net share issuance (including reinvested dividends) of $185 
billion strengthening the fact the investors demand for ETFs has increased 
compared to the past years (ICI Fact Book, 2013). During the recent financial 
crisis, ETFs have performed better than any other indexing product such as 
traditional mutual funds. However, in this paper the main focus is to highlight the 
performance during the financial crisis of a relatively new type of ETFs which is 
leveraged ETFs.  
 
There are two main varieties of leveraged ETFs; those that magnify an index‘s 
return (ultra or bull ETFs), and those that track or magnify its inverse (bear 
ETFs). Approximately 13 percent of the ETFs traded in the U.S. are of the 
leveraged variety, and they account for 26 percent of the ETF trading volume. In 
Canada, the comparable numbers are 26 percent and a striking 61 percent, 
respectively (Shum, 2011).These numbers continue to grow, and are testimony 
to the popularity of these funds, considering the first leveraged ETF was only 
introduced in June 2006. However, exactly because they are relatively new 
investment vehicles, little academic research has focused on the performance of 
these funds especially after the recent financial crisis in comparison with the 




1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
ETFs performance evaluation during the financial crisis is scarce and there has 
been little research undertaken which identifies the reasons behind the recent 
positive performance of the ETFs in the slow economic environment where every 
business sectors were affected due to the financial distress. Credit market, bond 
markets and housing market have seen the lowest return and downturn ever in 
recent history and the capital market dried up (e.g. DJIA and S&P indices hit 
record lows) during 2008. But the new innovation (ETFs) of the modern finance 
has stood out among them and retained healthy returns and ETFs such as 
leveraged and inverse ETFs have been at the centre of attraction among the 
institutional and as well as the major portion of the investors.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Leveraged ETFs have gained huge popularity and 
attention from the press coverage mainly due to the issues related with their 
performance. Renowned managers have centralized their focus about investor‘s 
attention on the impact of compounding especially when funds are held for more 
than one day.  But then again the main question raises is why Leveraged ETFs 
have performed better when every single big sector and industry was affected 
badly due to the financial crisis.  
 
In the investment literature ―tracking error‖ is the best measure to highlight ETFs 
performances which defines leveraged ETFs average deviation from its target 
return as well as the volatility of the deviation. We can break down the fund 
5 
 
performances into three components which an ETF investor may look into. These 
are as follows: 
1. The impact of compounding if the holding period is longer than one day 
2. The cost associated with management of the fund to achieve its 
investment objective and its effectiveness 
3. The impact of  trading discount/premium from its Net Asset Value (NAV) 
due to the efficiency of the leveraged ETF market 
 
In order to shed light on the performance of the leveraged ETFs, I have selected 
a group of North American based leveraged ETFs which are based on the 
S&P/TSX 60, S&P 500 and S&P/TSX Global Gold indices. 
1.3 Purpose of Study 
 
The financial crisis had many implications for financial markets and investors. 
The two most important problems in exchange traded funds and other indexing 
products which arose during the recent financial crisis were the liquidity 
constraint and increased counterparty risk. The high volatility and uncertainty in 
financial market resulted in a sharp decrease in liquidity in many traded assets. 
ETFs have seen large pricing differences with respect to their net asset value 
(NAV) as a consequence of a lack of liquidity of their underlying assets. Illiquidity 
of underlying assets has created problems for other types of indexing financial 
products, such as traditional mutual funds and some of them were closed 




Counterparty risk is another type of risk that the financial market has observed 
during the financial crisis in 2007-2008. Counterparty risk is especially a problem 
for non-traded derivate instruments, such as swaps. As a consequence, the 
financial crisis can be expected to have a strong impact on the perceived risk of 
OTC instruments, such as total return swaps. Recently, market participants 
increasingly became aware of the risk associated with their counterparty 
positions after the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 which was 
a leading provider of derivative products at that time.  
 
However, Leveraged ETFs are still the most preferred indexing instruments when 
it comes to a comparison between ETFs and other financial products that allow 
for trading baskets of assets. This is according to large institutional and wide 
spread investors. Leveraged ETFs are different in terms of how they operate 
than any other indexing product. For instance, leveraged ETFs aim to track daily 
returns instead of tracking the price of an underlying index at a higher frequency 
(e.g., 15-minute intervals, 30 minutes interval). Third party structured product 
specialist or mangers specialized in leveraged ETFs are employed to magnify the 
return of the fund by two time or three times than the funds return or its inverse 
by the same magnitude. Fund rebalancing is done once a day and its NAV is 




One of the best features of leveraged ETFs is that it allows investors to increase 
their market exposure or to hedge without a margin account and without any prior 
knowledge or expertise in leveraging or derivatives. The reason for this is that 
they maintained by professional and expert managers or third parties and thus its 
one of the attraction of this indexing product to investors. Moreover, it limits the 
losses of the value of the investor‘s wealth through inverse leveraged ETFs. In 
short, it hedges the exposure of losses that could occur through inverse 
leveraged ETFs (i.e. limit loss transaction). They may also serve as a substitute 
for short selling when the underlying assets are difficult and very expensive to 
borrow (Avellaneda, 2010). Regardless of its investors attracting capacity and 
glittering customized features, leveraged ETFs performance has been put into 
question in recent times. SEC, FINRA and IIIROC have all issued investor alerts 
over leveraged ETFs.  
 
Many articles have been published recently from the CFA Institute and in various 
newspapers covering the issues related to leveraged ETFs and criticizing their 
performances. Financial advisors have also kept them away from their clients 
and removing their focus to other sorts of indexing product. As mentioned earlier 
during the time of 2008 – 2010 leveraged ETFs performed better than most of 
the other indexing products. So I took this opportunity to study this fund type and 
analyze their performance during that tenure, also focusing on the risk 





The main objective of this paper is to highlight the performance of the leveraged 
ETFs during the financial crisis. While there is a lacking of research in this field of 
finance; however the current innovation and development of this field have 
gained the attention of many scholars who have contributed their thoughts in the 
structure, mechanism and regulatory aspect of ETFs. More detailed research and 
analysis are expected to emerge as the global economy is looking to get stronger 
and ETFs are expected to play a central role. However Shum (2011) from the 
Schulich Business School of York University has focused on the performance of 
the leveraged ETFs during the financial crisis, mainly focusing on the global and 
American funds. Thus I gained my personal interest to study this field of finance 
by taking the similar idea and attributes of her paper but studying it across only 
on North American leveraged ETFs.  
 
1.4 Justification of Study 
 
Although exchange-traded funds have existed for almost two decades, they have 
only recently drawn the attention of the research community. Cherry (2004), 
Engle and Sarkar (2006), Kayali (2007) and Madura and Ngo (2008) investigate 
the differences between ETF prices and their NAV. This paper is also related to 
the growing academic analysis of the financial crisis 2007/2008. Mizen (2008), 
Reinhard and Rogoff (2008), Shiller (2008), and Blanchard (2009) provide, for 
example, a detailed background of the financial crisis, Brunnermeier (2008) and 
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Allen and Carletti (2008) investigate more closely the liquidity problems 
originating from the crisis, and Gorton (2008) looks at the complex role of 
derivatives in the crisis.  
 
An excellent overview is provided by Deville (2007). The first influential papers on 
ETFs include Gastineau (2001) on early developments of ETFs, and Poterba and 
Shoven (2002) on ETF taxation. The only paper that investigates and analyzes 
the performance of ETFs during crises caused by market interruptions and trade 
suspensions of key ETF constituents is written by Tucker and Sanchez-Marin 
(2003). To my knowledge, there is very little academic literature that examines 
the impact of the financial crisis on the exchange-traded fund market and 
evaluates its performance during that time. My research provides insights on the 
performance of leveraged ETFs from an investor‘s perspective during the 
financial crisis to contribute to the literature of leveraged ETFs. In order to do so, 
I have decided to decompose the performance into three broad categories; 
discount/premium affect from its NAV, management expense affect on its 
performance and the compounding affect.  
 
Moreover in 2009, more than 84% of all participating institutional investors have 
been investing in equity ETFs, up from 75% in 2008. Similarly, investment in 
government bond ETFs gained popularity during the financial crisis. In contrast, 
the financial crisis imposes severe challenges for ETFs in alternative asset 
classes, especially in the case of hedge fund ETFs, where both usage and 
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satisfaction levels have dropped sharply within the last 12 months. A significant 
segment of the ETF market is made up of leveraged funds. As a result I chose to 
study and investigate this new phenomenon of the financial development to 
understand their dynamics and performance during the financial crisis.  
1.5 Organization of Study 
 
This study is broken down into five distinct chapters: The current chapter has 
provided a brief review of the research topic and the purpose of the study; 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the current literature and the subsequent 
foundation on which this study is built upon; Chapter 3 provides the methodology 
utilized for this study and Chapter 4 the empirical results and analysis. Finally 
Chapter 5 will provide a summary of the study and a conclusion. 
 
Chapter 3 will provide a detailed structure of the research which will consist of 
the reason behind selecting the time period which is from year 2005 to 2010. 
Moreover, the data will be used to analyze the performance of the ETFs will be 
retrieved from the public and open internet sources such as Google and Yahoo 
finance. In addition I will be using ETF database, Morningstar database and 
Market watch database.  
 
In brief the best way to measure ETFs performance is to measure the tracking 
error volatility and yearly return in comparison with the benchmark. The most 
efficient criteria to measure ETFs performance would be the following: 
i. Performance relative to the benchmark 
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ii. Liquidity spread (which measures the size issues ) 
iii. Tracking error volatility (for actively managed funds) 
 
In an idealistic situation the best performance of an index fund would include the 
following:  
1. Maximizing the outperformance vs the benchmark 
2. with a minimal liquidity spread (cost) and 
3. the lowest Tracking Error 
 
In this paper I would report which are the ETFs that have successfully followed 
the above criteria and provided a superior performance. The model to evaluate 
these performance would to be run an regression with a benchmark (Market 
Index return) being the independent variable and the ETFs return being the 
dependent variable to find out the beta coefficient. The correlation coefficient is 
also a decisive factor to find out the co movement of the ETFs and the market 
index and thus the R-square of the regression.  
 
To analyze the performance of leveraged ETFs, firstly I have started by providing 
an overview of the performance of the sample of leveraged ETFs over different 
holding periods, focusing on their alphas and betas, for the period January 1, 
2008 to December 31, 2009 which will be described in chapter 4. The time period 
is the period that is at the heart of the recent financial crisis era. Moreover the 
alphas and betas have to have statistical significance over the performance and 
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thus estimated alphas from the sample that are needed to be close to zero and 
estimated betas close to 2 for bull ETFs and -2 for bear ETFS. This is because I 
am analyzing the performance of leveraged ETFs with 2x return than its index or 
the inverse. Alphas close to zero and betas close to 2 (Bull) and -2 (bear) are 
statistically significant to conclude that the leveraged ETFs have performed well. 
Regression analysis will be used to estimate the alphas and the betas by 
regressing the returns of the leveraged ETFs against the return of its underlying 
index.  
 
The fund generates returns based on the market prices which investors receive, 
but in general the returns are based on three broad influential factors that I have 
underscored before and those are the compounding factors, management and 
the trading premium/discount factors. Since my sample period covers the time 
period of the financial crisis, analyzing the performance would provide a good 
edge to understand the how returns of leveraged ETFs were generated during 
the financial crisis. 
 
Secondly, I would analyze the deviation of the return from its target return by 
decomposing each type of leveraged ETFs that I have taken into consideration 
namely S&P/TSX 60, S&P 500, and S&P/TSX Global Gold Index. Finally, I would 
analyze the bid-ask spread to stress the market liquidity issues which are widely 
used by many as a good measurement of liquidity and analyze the intra-day 
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trading patterns of leveraged ETFs which is proposed by Shum (2011)  to 
analyze the differences of returns between bull and bear leveraged ETFs.  
 
In my studies I found that bear ETFs deviate from their target return much more 
quickly than that of the bull ETFs as the holding periods extends. From the 
popular beliefs it is expected that the tracking error (volatility) due to 
premium/discount trading is high during the financial crisis and the alphas could 
be mostly negative and can be very large when the holding period varies from 
small to large number of days respectively, i.e. when the holding period is 
changed from 1 week holding period to one year holding period respectively.  
 
In this paper I have used the leveraged ETFs that are designed to produce twice 
the return of the underlying index as ―2x bulls‖ and those designed to produce 
twice the inverse of the return of the underlying index as ―2x bears‖. There are 
leveraged ETFs available which seek 3x bulls or bears but my focus in this paper 
is only on the 2x bulls and bears variety. the target returns objective are basically 
set in daily return i.e. the 2x bulls or bears are the target return of a fund on daily 
basis. Thus there is a compounding affect and the return generated over periods 
rather than one day will likely differ in amount and possibly direction from the 
target return for the same period of time. Proshares is an example of fund that 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
After the introduction in 1993, Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) have been steadily 
increasing in popularity and more and more institutional investors are being 
actively involved in this type of financial product.  These investment vehicles can 
be used to help diversify a portfolio at a low cost or to make tactical investment 
moves. A good portion of the ETF market is made up of leveraged ETF funds 
that seek to provide a multiple of the returns on a given index.  Leveraged ETFs 
require the use of financial engineering techniques, including the use of equity 
swaps, derivatives and rebalancing, and re-indexing to achieve the desired 
return. There are also many inverse ETFs that aim to go up when the market 
goes down, and vice versa.  
 
ProShares first introduced the first wave of leveraged ETFs in 2006 named as 
"Ultra ProShares‖. It was designed to double (2x) the daily performance of the 
underlying indexes they track. For example, the ProShares Ultra Dow 30 ETF 
(DDM) is structured to gain 2% when the Dow Jones Industrial Average gains 
1%. Consequently, DDM will lose 2% if the Dow loses 1%.  
 
For leveraged ETFs rebalancing and re-indexing is often considered to be a 
decisive issue due to its considerable costs when markets are volatile. 
The rebalancing problem is that the fund manager incurs trading losses and 
transaction cost  because he needs to buy when the index goes up and sell when 
the index goes down in order to maintain a fixed leverage ratio. The re-indexing 
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problem of leveraged ETFs arises from the volatility of the underlying index which 
is often termed as an arithmetic problem by many scholars.  
 
Leveraged ETFS like any other ETFs, generally provide the easy diversification, 
low expense ratios, and tax efficiency of index funds, while still maintaining all the 
features of ordinary stock, such as limit orders, short selling, and options. As 
ETFs can be economically acquired, held, and disposed of, they used as a long-
term investment by some investors for asset allocation purposes. On the other 
hand some investors just follow market timing investment strategies by frequently 
trading ETF shares. 
2.1 Mutual Fund Vs ETFs/leveraged ETFs 
 
It is useful to understand the distinction between mutual funds and exchange 
traded fund and particularly leveraged exchange traded funds. Like any other 
ETFs, leveraged ETFs trade on the exchange thus they are subject to brokerage 
commission in each transaction. Brokerage commission is generally a matter of 
the type of plan chosen by the customer/investors. For example, a typical flat fee 
schedule from an online brokerage firm in the United States ranges from $10 to 
$20 whereas it can be as low as $0 with discount brokers. As a result of the 
commission charged by the broker, the invested capital has a great bearing, i.e. 
someone with $100 investment capital will lose significant percentage of capital 
right way rather than the investor with $1,000,000 of investment capital to whom 
the brokerage commission is a negligible amount. Contrary to leveraged ETF or 
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general ETF, mutual funds are obtained directly from the fund company itself. 
This brokerage fees creates a huge distinction between mutual fund and 
leveraged ETF because the leveraged ETF become very competitive when low 
or no cost transactions are available.  
 
ETFs have a lower expense ratio than comparable mutual funds. Not only does 
an ETF have lower shareholder-related expenses but also ETFs do not need to 
maintain a cash reserve for redemption as they do not have to invest cash 
contributions or fund cash redemptions. This is similar to a closed end mutual 
fund. Moreover, mutual funds can charge 1% to 3% in general or more index 
fund expense ratios whereas it is as low as 0.1% to 1% range. However, over the 
long term there could be a significant difference when these transaction costs are 
included and compound.  
 
The cost difference is more evident when compared with mutual funds that 
charge a front-end or back-end load as ETFs do not have loads at all. The 
redemption fee and short-term trading fees are examples of other fees 
associated with mutual funds that do not exist with ETFs. Traders should be 
cautious if they plan to trade inverse and leveraged ETFs for short periods of 
time. Close attention should be paid to transaction costs and daily performance 
rates as the potential combined compound loss can sometimes go unrecognized 




The advantages of the leveraged ETFs are:  
 They offer an easy and inexpensive way to use leverage without using 
options or margin.  
 They are available in retirement accounts.   
 A good trading tool for short-term traders or investors with a short-term 
investment horizon. 
 
The disadvantages associated with leveraged ETFs include:  
 The long term inaccuracy that can be resulted due to the impact of 
negative compounding can.   
 Very low level of liquidity as scholars argue that many leveraged ETFs 
trade only on an average of few thousand shares per day.  
 Investors‘ knowledge about leveraged ETF is another disadvantage that 
hinders investors participation in this indexing product.  
Overall, leveraged ETFs are a useful new vehicle for the right strategy and for an 
investor who performs his or her due diligence. 
2.2 Scope of Literature Review 
 
It is important to mention to reaffirm that leveraged ETFs are very new in the 
financial world and not too many researchers have focused on this side of 
finance. However with growing popularity in the investment world, leveraged 
ETFs are becoming one of the ‗hot‘ prospects to talk about by many scholars and 




There are bundles of research papers being published every year on indexing 
products such as mutual funds and very few on exchange traded funds (ETFs). 
But due to the short span of history till today, leveraged ETFs are just in the 
beginning phase of successful life since 2006. Thus its keeps the door open for 
many issues to be raised, discussed, developed and changed regarding 
leveraged ETFs. This could be the beginning of many research papers to be 
published in the coming years. However, big institutions which cover a big portion 
of the investors who invest on leveraged ETFs have contributed to the literature 
of this product, but mainly focusing on their product features and attracting target 
customers/investors. In addition, few have also focused on different indexing 
techniques that could apply to create financial products like leveraged ETFs.  
 
In one of the recent studies regarding leveraged ETFs the impact of 
compounding has been raised (Avellaneda and Zhang, 2009). Cheng and 
Madhaven (2009), Lu, et al (2009), and Hill and Foster (2009) have all 
contributed their ideas on the similar issues regarding leveraged ETFs. However 








Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Types of exchange traded funds used and their Underlying Indexes 
 
In this paper, as mentioned earlier I have only used the leveraged ETFs that are 
designed to provide twice the return of the underlying index which we refer as ‗2x 
bulls‖. On the other hand there are funds which provide return inverse of twice 
the return of the underlying index which we call ―2x bears‖. There are also other 
types exists in the market such 3x variety which intend to provide a return three 
times of the return of the underlying index. However these 3x variety of leveraged 
ETFs are fairly new.  
 
In this paper I have used leveraged ETFs which are based on equity indices. 
One of them is the based on the Canadian blue chips namely S&P/TSX 60 and it 
is mainly comprised of 60 of the largest (by market capitalization) and most liquid 
securities listed on the TSX. The index is selected by S&P using its industrial 
classifications and guidelines for evaluating issuer capitalization, liquidity and 
fundamentals. The next index consists of securities of global gold sectors issuers 
listed on the TSX, NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX and it is known as S&P/TSX 
Global Gold index. Both of these indexes are managed by BetaPro in Canada 
which is by far one of the largest ETF product provider specialized on different 
industries and geographical location based on different investment needs.  
 
Last but not the least; I have used the US blue chips S&P500 which is managed 
by ProShare in the US. It is probably the best known index for most of the active 
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managers who use it as a benchmark. According to S&P, the total assets 
invested in products indexed to the S&P 500 are nearly about $1 trillion and the 
figure has increased dramatically as more and more investors have adapted 
indexing as a investment strategy like mutual funds and exchange traded funds. 
ETFs account for a growing portion of assets indexed directly to the S&P 500, 
with the three U.S. listed products seeking to replicate the index maintaining total 
assets just worth of $135 billion. That figure represents more than 10% of total 
ETF assets around the world which confirms the importance of S&P 500 
exposure as an indexing investment strategy.  
3.2 Tickers 
 
The HXU (2x Bull) and the HXD (2x bear) are the tickers that are used for 
leveraged ETFs which seek daily investment results equal to 200% the daily 
performance, or inverse daily performance, of the S&P/TSX60 Index before fees 
and expenses. Both of these funds are managed by Beta Pro.  
 
The HGU (2x Bull) and the HGD (2x bear) are the tickers also managed by 
BetaPro based on the S&P/TSX Global Gold index. It also seeks daily investment 
results equal to +/- 200% the daily performance. 
 
The third type of leveraged ETFs have been used which are based on the S&P 
500 2x bull and bear and the tickers for these funds are SSO and SDS 





Data were collected from Bloomberg and Yahoo finance and the data regarding 
the NAV of the leveraged ETFs are gathered from BetaPro and ProShares. It is 
also useful to mention that some index returns are tracked directly from the open 
source such as Google finance and Yahoo finance. But the majority of the data 
were gathered from organized data sources like BetaPro and Bloomberg. The 
NAVs are adjusted to give the exact replication in case of splits or consolidations 
that might have taken place during my sample period of January 01, 2008 to 
December 31, 2009. Any dividend distribution or any distributed capital gains are 
also adjusted accordingly in order to calculate the daily change in the NAV.  
 
3.4 Calculating the net returns and its deviation from the target return 
 
Evaluating ETFs performance has to be broken down into the categories and one 
of the steps is to find the compounding affect of daily target return over the 
holding period. Companies that manage exchange traded funds set up target 
returns on a daily basis, thus it has a compounding effect over the holding period. 
The compounding affect on cumulative return is a fact that cannot be changed. In 
order to estimate the compounding affect cumulative return over two days 
holding period will have a net return on the underlying index like the following 




Now the fund with a target return of ―2x bulls‖ will have a net cumulative return 
like the following 
(1 + 2Rt)(1 + 2Rt +1) −1 = 2(Rt + Rt +1+ Rt.Rt +1) + 2.Rt.Rt +1  …………..  (3.2) 
From equation (3.1) and (3.2) it is clearly understood that the deviation due to 
compounding with a perfect replication i.e. the deviation of perfect replication of 
the index with ‗2x bulls‖ type would be (2) – 2 x (1) = 2.Rt.Rt +1. Similarly for a 2x 
bear leveraged ETF would have the net return over a 2 day holding period like 
the following  
(1 - 2Rt)(1 - 2Rt +1) − 1 = - 2(Rt + Rt +1+ Rt.Rt +1) + 6.Rt.Rt +1 ………….. (3.3) 
The deviation due to compounding is 6.Rt.Rt +1 for the 2x bear leveraged ETF 
assuming that the fund has been perfectly replicated of the underlying index. It is 
very important to realize that the coefficient attached with the returns of the 2x 
bear ETF is larger than that of the 2x bull ETFs. Mathematically the 2x bear ETF 
return deviation is three times bigger than the deviation of the return of 2x bulls 
ETFs. The daily returns would be positive in case of any momentum affect 
(positive or negative) in daily returns. If the underlying index is trending up, then 
a 2x bull ETF will generate higher returns than otherwise and a 2x bear ETF will 
generate a smaller loss than otherwise (Shum, 2011). Moreover a negative 
autocorrelation between returns in day t and the day t+1 or vice versa would 
result in a negative deviation. Therefore both the 2x bulls and 2x bears will 
generate a negative return even if the underlying index breaks even. But in such 
a case the 2x bears will be three times larger than the 2x bulls due to its 
compounding affect on net return of 6.Rt.Rt +1 which is 3 times larger than the 
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compounding affect of net return generated by 2x bulls which is 2.Rt.Rt +1 over 
the underlying index.  
 
Any residual deviations of return in the actual leveraged ETF from the market 
returns are likely because of the management style and to the existence of 
trading premiums/discounts. Firstly, it is not often as easy task for the 
management to be able to consistently track the target return with perfection 
because risk such as credit and liquidity risk, counterparty risk, currency risk and 
so on are also involved in the process which managers need to deal with. 
Moreover, the fees and expenses are also the factors that should be taken into 
consideration. Secondly, temporary loss in the market efficiency may cause the 
leveraged ETF market price to deviate from its net asset value (NAV) which we 
have observed during the recent financial crisis and liquidity problem in 2008. In 
such a case the cost of rebalancing the leveraged ETF become more expensive 
as it requires rebalancing on a daily basis.  
 
3.5 Decomposing the Return Deviation  
 
There are several factors that affect the daily return to deviate from the target 
return. For instance management of the ETF, trading discount/premium from its 
NAV. But the deviation can be caused by market liquidity, market efficiency of the 
ETF and derivative market, cost of leverage rather than just management fees or 
brokerage fees alone. As we have seen from the previous section, the beta 
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estimates can deviate from a range of 2 to -2 thus market price prices can differ 
significantly. The returns over the long holding period would be affected by these 
factors if they are not random noise or happen to by just chance and cancel each 
other out. To determine the relative importance of the compounding return and 
the management factors, I have divided the deviation of the leveraged ETFs from 
its target return.  
 
The decomposition can be done by considering again a 2 day holding period. For 
a 2x bulls ETF the deviation on day t due to compounding, DCPt, can be written 
as: 
DCPt = [(1+2Rt)(1 + 2Rt−1) − 1] − 2[(1 + Rt)(1 + Rt−1) − 1] …………………..  (3.4) 
 
where,  Rt is the underlying index return. 
The deviations due to management factors, DMt, are therefore the residual 
difference: 
DMt = [(1+RBull,NAV,t)(1 + RBull, NAV,t−1) − 1] − [(1 + 2Rt)(1 + 2Rt−1) − 1]  ……… (3.5) 
where RBull, NAV,t is the return of the 2x bull ETF‘s NAV. NAV have been used here 
instead of market price due to the fact that managers rebalances the portfolio to 
the fund NAV, but not to the market price. Thus we can also conclude that the 





From Equation (3.4) and (3.5), the net return of holding the 2x bull ETF for 2 days 
regardless of any trading premium/discount is  
{(1 + RBull,NAV,t)(1 + RBull,NAV,t−1) −1}= 2[(1+rt)(1 + rt−1) − 1] + DCPt + DMt ……….(3.6) 
For 2x bear ETFs. ―2‖ in Equation (3.4) and (3.6) would be replaced by ―2‖.  
The premium, Pt the equation would be as follows: 
Pt = ET Ft − NAVt  ………………………………………………………………. (3.7) 
where, ETFt is the end-of-day market price and NAVt is the end-of-day NAV of the 
leveraged ETF on day t. The leveraged ETF is trading at a discount if the sign of 
Equation (3.7) is negative.  
3.6 Tracking Error 
 
Tracking error is a measure of how closely a portfolio follows the index to which it 
is benchmarked. The best measure is the root mean square of the difference 
between the portfolio and index returns. If tracking error is measured historically, 
it is called 'realized' or 'ex post' tracking error. If a model is used to predict 
tracking error, it is called 'ex ante' tracking error. Ex-post tracking error is more 
useful for reporting performance, whereas ex-ante tracking error is generally 
used by portfolio managers to control risk. In this paper I use the Ex-Post 
tracking error as my paper tracks the performance of ETFs during the financial 
crisis and more precisely the period between 2005 -2010.  
The ex-post tracking error formula is the root mean square (RMS) of the active 
returns  
 ………………… (3.8) 
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Where, rp − rb is the active return, i.e., the difference between the portfolio return 
and the benchmark return. 
Nevertheless it is commonly calculated as the standard deviation of the active 
returns: 
… (3.9) 
which in case of large portfolio deviations would lessen TE significantly and 
mislead its original meaning.  
 
Tracking error is often cited as one of the most important considerations when 
selecting an ETF. It measures the quality of index replication, i.e. how well a fund 
manager replicates the performance of a specific index. Investors typically expect 
their ETF to adhere tightly to an index. Thus tracking error measurement of ETFs 
is the central body of this paper to evaluate its performance during the period 
2005 – 2010.  
It is important to realize that the calculation of tracking error can result in different 
values depending on a variety of factors which include, but are not limited to:  
 The frequency of observations, i.e. whether daily, weekly or monthly data 
is used  
 The day chosen as the starting point for the calculation. For example,  
when weekly data are used, i.e. whether weekly returns are calculated 
from Friday to Friday, Monday to Monday, etc., or also whether weekly 
average data are used  
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 The time period, i.e. whether tracking error is calculated over one, three or 
five years, or longer 
 
3.7 The regression and the statistical analysis 
 
In the regression analysis the ETF returns are calculated using the market prices 
obtained from the data source mentioned earlier. The market price allows us to 
analyze the ETFs performance from the investor‘s perspective even though it is 
very common to see manager rebalancing the portfolio with respect to NAV of 
the funds they are managing. Any difference between the underlying index and 
NAV will result in premium/discount which the fund is trading and the investors 
will compensate or receive the return according to the market price. It is very 
important to understand that estimating the betas and alphas over the different 
holding periods of the selected funds will enhance our knowledge about the 
performance of those funds. Thus the regression analysis will help us to identify 
three key issues about the ETF performances and those are the following 
 
i) Betas: 
 It will allow us to test whether the beta coefficients are aligned with the 
promised/target parameter i.e. for a 2x bull leveraged ETFs, it is expected to 
have a beta coefficient of +2 and for 2x bears it is expected to have a beta 
coefficient of -2. But the estimated beta coefficient from the sample will allow us 
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to see if it deviates from the promised (2 for 2x bull and -2 for 2x bears) beta 
coefficient and the magnitude of that deviation.  
 
ii) Alphas:  
We can also test whether the alphas or ―the intercept‖ of the fund are statistically 
and economically different from zero. 
 
iii) Coefficient of Determination (R-Square):  
It is important for us to identify whether the coefficient of determination or the R-
square is statistically significant enough and whether the variation of the 
underlying index explains the variation of returns of the leveraged exchange 
traded fund which can be indicated by high R-Square.  
 
Hypothesis: 
In order for organized analysis and simplicity I would emphasize and highlight my 
null (Ho) and alternative (Ha) hypothesis for each type of leveraged ETF and the 
results will be discussed in the next chapter. As we want to measure the Alpha 
and the Betas of the exchange traded fund to measure how close it comes to 
promised or targeted return, thus for each type of fund that I have examined here 






Type of Fund Alpha Beta 
2x Bull 
(HXU, HGU, SSO) 
Ho = 0 
Ha ≠ 0 
Ho = 2 
Ha ≠ 2 
2x Bear 
(HXD, HGD, SDS) 
Ho = 0 
Ha ≠ 0 
Ho = - 2 
Ha ≠ - 2 
 
 
One of the key things for the regression analysis was to choose different holding 
periods for the selected funds. I have considered the one and two days. One 
week (5 trading days), three months (63 trading days) and one year (252 trading 
days) were chosen for the investment horizon for the performance analysis of the 
leveraged exchange traded funds. The selection of the investment horizon also 
brings up a new challenge that is the possibility of potential bias due to the 
creation of overlapping samples of data. For instance one day and two days 
return will overlap in a one week holding period returns. Thus to overcome this 
problem I have utilized Newey-West (1987) standard error to report t statistics. It 
is often used to correct the effects of correlation in the error terms in regressions 








Chapter 4: Results 
 
I begin with the analysis by providing a brief overview about the performance of 
the each leveraged ETFs that I have chosen for this paper. First of all, I assess 
the overall performance of the S&P/TSX 60 2x Bull (ticker: HXU) and 2x bear 
(ticker: HXD) ETFs and then moving on to the other ETFs like HGU, HGD, SSO 
and SDS respectively. Appendix A contains the summary statistics, regression 
analysis and mean deviation from target return.  
4.1 Performance overview 
 
HXU and HXD ETFs 
Due to the recent market fallout in 2008 we have observed huge negative returns 
of the S&P/TSX 60 index which resulted in a larger mean of HXD than that of 
HXU over the sample period of 2008 to 2009. HXD has a positive skewness 
while the HXU reports a negative skewness and the standard deviation of both 
ETFs are almost close to each other and almost twice the size of the underlying 
index in magnitude. As mentioned earlier, the null hypothesis for the betas of 2x 
bull ETFs are Ho = 2 and for 2x bear ETFs are Ho = -2 and for the alphas Ho = 0. 
With a holding period of 1-month and 3-month, the betas in Table A-1 report a 
figure close to 2 for HXU (1.9673 and 1.9324 for 1-month and 3-month 
respectively) and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, whereas the HXD ETFs 
has shown larger deviation over 1-year holding period and resulted in estimated 
beta coefficient of -1.2234 (see Table A-1). For HXD the null hypothesis cannot 




Estimating the alphas of these ETFs gives us a clearer idea about its 
performance as its measures the return of the ETF when their underlying index 
has zero return across different holding periods. For instance, a 1 year holding 
period, investors would lose 22% of their investment even when the S&P/TSX 60 
has a return of 0% in HXD. However its much smaller across other holding 
periods, both in HXD and HXU ETFs. 
 
HGU and HGD 
For the 2x bull gold ETF (Ticker: HGU), the estimated beta can be rejected for 
only 1 month and 1 year holding period however, it is rejected for all holding 
periods for 2x bear Gold ETF (Ticker: HGD). The 2x bear gold ETF has a very 
small beta (0.0959) coefficient during the 1 year holding period and the estimated 
alpha (-0.8412) is quite huge representing that the investors will lose 84%, even 
if the changes return of the index has a return of 0% which is quite surprising. In 
such a case the gold index has to drop by quite a large margin to provide the 
break-even to the investors for their invested capital.  
 
 
SSO and SDS  
The beta estimates of the SSO are closest to target of 2 for the 1 month and 3 
month holding periods whereas for the SDS, the estimated betas are close to 
target of -2 for 1 week and 1 month holding period. Both of the ETF show 
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volatility twice the size of their underlying index of S&P 500 and equally 
leptokurtic in nature. The SDS alpha estimates are also the smallest in a 1 year 
time period investment horizon.  
4.2 Analysis of Tracking Error 
 
In this section I am going to summarize the compounding σ(DCPt) and 
management σ(DMt) tracking errors which are basically the standard deviations 
that I have discussed in Chapter 3. Both tracking errors due to compounding 
σ(DCPt) and tracking errors due to management σ(DMt) increase along with the 
length of the holding period. However all the ETF have provided a larger tracking 
error due to compounding from over the sample period, except SDS. Thus we 
can clearly conclude that compounding is the not main factor to deviate the daily 
return from the target return for SDS ETF, but management is as it contributes 
more deviation (tracking error) than compounding factor. Both of the leveraged 
ETFs HXU and HXD have a negative mean deviation due to compounding 
across different holding periods. However the mean deviation due to 
management could be either positive or negative. For HXU the management 
factors had a bigger impact whereas the compounding factors have more 
influence over HXD over the one year holding period.  
 
Among the gold leveraged ETFs, HGD has a positive mean deviation for all of 
the holding periods. Investors who invested in 2x bear gold ETFs suffered from 
smaller loss during the bull gold market which is mostly due to management 
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factors rather than compounding factors. In 2008 the drag due to compounding 
was large for HGD as the mean deviations were all negative for HGD. Moreover 
the correlation coefficient was small between the mean deviation due to 
management factors and compounding factors. For leveraged ETFs, SSO and 
SDS, the results are similar to other ETFs presented here. Much of the deviation 
of the target return came from the management factors rather than the 
compounding factors. 
 
One of the major impacts due to the financial crisis was the problem of liquidity in 
the market. From my results I found that during 2008, there was increased 
volatility in premium (Pt). Given the financial turmoil and uncertainty at the time, 
trading premiums/discounts might have been influenced by market sentiment, 
similar to the case of closed-end mutual fund discounts (Lee, et al (1991)), and 
by the drying up of liquidity which caused larger bid-ask spreads. 
4.3 Intraday Dynamics  
 
To corroborate the claim that reduced liquidity caused the increase in 
premium/discount volatility during the financial crisis, I examine the market 
microstructure of the leveraged ETFs during the crisis period. To be specific, I 
study the impact of the crisis on the leveraged ETFs‘ intraday trading patterns. 
The three intraday variables that I focus on are: Share price volatility (as 
measured by the standard deviation of transaction prices), trading volume, and 
the bid-ask spread. To investigate how share price volatility changes throughout 
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the trading day, I need to estimate it within a fixed time interval. I followed the 15 
minute interval as my intraday period in this paper, and construct my variables of 
interest for each 15-minute interval. Each trading day consists of 26 15-minute 
intervals starting at 9:30-9:44, and ending at 15:45-15:59.  
 
Due to the large volume of intraday data, studies in this literature typically employ 
a sample period of one year. In order to explore the impact of the financial crisis 
on the market microstructure of the leveraged ETFs, I focus on the year 2008. In 
particular, I divide the intraday data into two subsamples: January 1 to 
September 14, and September 15 to December 31. The significance of 
September 15, 2008 is of course the fall of Lehman Brothers, which is widely 
regarded as the pivotal point of the financial crisis, and the start of the precipitous 
slide of the global stock market. Due to the lack of access to Canadian intraday 
data, the two TSX-traded leveraged ETFs are excluded from this analysis. 
 
Overall, for all three intraday variables, they display an approximately U-shape 
pattern that is found in NYSE-traded stocks and international ETFs (Shum, 
2010). The financial crisis has a much bigger impact on the mean intraday share 
price volatility of the 2x bear ETFs than the 2x bull ETFs showed in Figure A-2 
(Panel A). See the Appendix A for the 2x bear ETFs (SDS), the jump in mean 
volatility is substantial and statistically significant. For the 2x bull ETFs (SSO), 
however, the slight increases in the middle of the trading day are not statistically 
significant. That said, both types of ETFs have in common that during the 
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financial crisis, mean volatility showed a more decisive U-shape pattern, meaning 
that volatility was the highest at market open and at close.  
 
Panel B in Figure A-2 shows the mean intraday trading volume pattern and the 
impact of the financial crisis during the regular trading hours. Trading volume was 
higher across the board, and the differences were significant at the five percent 
level, except for five 15-minute periods (indicated by the grey bars in the 
diagram). Interestingly, even though the financial crisis increased the mean 
intraday share price volatility of the two 2x bull ETFs in a relatively moderate 
fashion, the impact it had on their mean intraday trading volume is by comparison 
much more prominent. In other words, a surge in trading volume does not 
necessarily increase share price volatility.  
 
Panel C in Figure A-2 shows that the mean intraday bid-ask spread pattern 
before and after the start of the financial crisis. The spread variable is a 
percentage, and is defined as (Ask-Bid)/Bid * 100%, where Ask and Bid are the 
average bid and average ask prices over each 15-minute interval on a given 
trading day. The bid-ask spread is a widely recognized measure of market 
liquidity, and the larger the spread, the higher the indirect cost of trading for 
investors. Panel C indicates that prior to the financial crisis, the mean spread was 





This is the typical pattern observed elsewhere in the stock market. Brock and 
Kleidon (1992) provides a market power model that explains the simultaneous 
observation of high trading volume and large bid-ask spreads at market open. 
They argue that because trading is halted after 4pm, there is an inelastic 
transaction demand when the market re-opens. Market makers take advantage 
of this knowledge, and widen the spread. After September 15, 2008, the spreads 



















Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The popularity of Leveraged ETFs has been astonishing over the last half 
decades and quickly become the most popular tools for investors who want to 
hedge their positions. The market of leveraged ETF has reported a steady 
growth since their introduction in mid 2006 and they reached to the all time high 
in recent times. However, leveraged ETFs have dealt with some criticism as well 
such as the investors complaining that the returns were different from their target 
or expected returns in recent years. Moreover, some brokers in the U.S. have 
banned their advisors from recommending these products and regulators are 
calling for better investor education and knowledge regarding these products.  
 
The primary goal of this paper was to study the performance of a sample of 
equity leveraged ETFs. I have disentangled different components of a fund‘s 
returns in order to evaluate the performance, from an investor‘s perspective. A 
secondary objective was to examine the impact of the recent financial crisis on 
the performance and the market microstructure of these funds. 
 
To recap, a leveraged ETF is designed to replicate twice (or thrice) the daily 
return of its underlying index. If the fund is held for more than one day, then its 
compounded return will deviate from that of the underlying index, creating 
tracking errors. However, deviations from target return can also be caused by 
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management factors, including the manager‘s ability to deliver the promised 
returns, expenses, margin costs, counterparty risk (e.g., in the case of swap 
contracts), currency risk (in the case of foreign indices), and so on. In addition, 
deviations can also result from trading premiums/discounts. There is a tendency 
for leveraged ETF managers and the media to blame poor performance on the 
effects of compounding, and the other two types of deviations have received little 
attention. In this paper, I attempted to shed light on this issue. I decomposed the 
returns of a leveraged ETF to investors into these three "buckets", and study the 
relative importance of each, focusing on the periods before, during, and after the 
financial crisis. 
 
To summarize the results, I found empirical supports that bear ETFs deviate from 
their target return much more quickly than their bull counterparts as the holding 
period lengthens. Contrary to popular belief though, returns to leveraged ETFs 
can deviate from their target even if investors rebalance on a daily basis. For 
example, in the case of the EAFE and EM 2x bear ETFs, their respective 
underlying indices explained only 36 to 40 percent of the variations in their daily 
returns during the sample period. A likely explanation is the nonsynchronicity in 
the trading between the ETFs and their respective underlying indices. That said, 
the impact of nonsynchronicity seems to average out over a week (five trading 




In terms of the alphas, which represent the return accrued to investors if the 
underlying index had a zero percent return, they are all negative, and they 
typically become statistically significantly different from zero starting at the 1-
week holding period. Some alphas can be alarmingly large, particularly when the 
funds are held for a year. 
 
When I decompose the deviations of the leveraged ETFs from their target return, 
I found that the tracking error due to management factors can be greater than 
that due to compounding for certain ETFs. In addition, the mean deviations due 
to compounding and to management factors in a given year can be positive or 
negative.  
 
In terms of the time series relationship between the two types of deviations, the 
correlation coefficients tend to be small or negative overall, suggesting that the 
two are likely driven by different forces, and do not reinforce each other in 
dragging down or pulling up the returns of the leveraged ETFs. For most of the 
funds in the study, the mean deviations due to compounding were the biggest in 
2008, the year of the financial crisis. There was a noticeable jump in trading 
premiums/discounts during the financial crisis, both in terms of magnitude and 





Last but not least, I find that the financial crisis had an asymmetric impact on the 
bull versus the bear ETFs‘ intraday trading patterns. It had a much bigger effect 
on the intraday share price volatility of the bear ETFs than the bull ETFs, even 
though the latter experienced a much greater surge in trading volume during the 
crisis. In terms of the intraday average bid—ask spreads, the results show that 
most of the leveraged ETFs suffered a significant reduction in liquidity during the 
financial crisis, explaining the jump in trading premiums/discounts in that period.  
 
In conclusion, because of the unprecedented volatility and the drying up of 
liquidity in the fall of 2008, the performance of some of the leveraged ETFs 
studied in this paper was severely impacted. Going forward and barring another 
major financial crisis, the deviations from target return (for different holding 
periods) shown in this paper may represent the upper bound. And the trading 
premiums/discounts, which were shown to be highly volatile during the financial 
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Table A-1: S&P/TSX60, HXU (2x Bull), and HXD (2x Bear)  
January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2009 
Section A: Summary statistics of the daily returns based on Market 
Prices   
Ticker Mean  
Std 
Dev Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
HXU -0.0002 0.0421 -0.4099 2.2705 0.1476 -0.1860 
HXD 0.0000 0.0429 0.3028 2.5164 0.1967 -0.1702 
S&P/TSX60 -0.0001 0.0223 -0.2778 3.4393 0.1033 -0.0979 
 







R2   
 




HXU   -0.0003 1.8341 0.9675   
 
    (1.36) (4.21)     
 
HXD   0.0000 -1.8614 0.9683   
 
    (0.12) (4.37)     
 




HXU   -0.0006 1.8998 0.9794   
 
    (1.99) (3.91)     
 
HXD   -0.0002 -1.9169 0.9776   
 
    (0.89) 2.9892     
 




HXU   -0.0014 1.9436 0.9882   
 
    (2.93) (2.98)     
 
HXD   -0.0013 -1.9835 0.9737   
 
    (1.69) 0.687     
 




HXU   -0.0062 1.9673 0.9907   
 
    (5.09) (0.68)     
 
HXD   -0.011 -1.9311 0.9505   
 
    (3.56) 1.90      
 




HXU   -0.0098 1.9324 0.9878   
 
    (3.14) (1.25)     
 
HXD   -0.0226 -1.7862 0.9117   
 
    (2.77) 2.921     
 





HXU   -0.0899 1.8413 0.9797   
 
    (8.03) (3.72)     
 
HXD   -0.2212 -1.2234 0.8223   
 






Table A-2: S&P/TSX60, HGU (2x Bull), and HGD (2x Bear)  
January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2009 
 
Section A: Summary statistics of the daily returns based on Market Prices 
Ticker Mean  Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis Max Min 
HGU 0.0010 0.0736 0.9108 6.0041 0.5010 -0.2461 
HGD -0.0019 0.0750 -0.9585 7.4245 0.2846 -0.5414 
S&P/TSX60 0.0008 0.0403 0.7928 6.4977 0.2776 -0.1624 
 







R2   
 




HGU   -0.0005 1.7997 0.9702   
 
    (1.36) (7.21)     
 
HGD   -0.0004 -1.8392 0.9771   
 
    (1.35) 7.66      
 




HGU   -0.001 1.8771 0.9833   
 
    (1.98) (7.27)     
 
HGD   -0.0013 -1.8974 0.9763   
 
    (2.27) 3.7985     
 




HGU   -0.0028 1.9328 0.9862   
 
    (2.81) (2.82)     
 
HGD   -0.0054 -1.9124 0.9582   
 
    (2.84) 2.1215     
 




HGU   -0.0173 1.9519 0.9807   
 
    (5.43) (1.01)     
 
HGD   -0.0476 -1.6483 0.8376   
 
    (4.88) 3.62      
 




HGU   -0.0659 1.8758 0.9454   
 
    (7.49) (2.02)     
 
HGD   -0.1589 -1.2883 0.6366   
 
    (7.86) 7.2269     
 




HGU   -0.4286 1.9152 0.9454   
 
    (29.41) (1.09)     
 
HGD   -0.8247 -0.0959 0.2101   
 





Mean Deviations from Target Return Based on NAVs 
S&P/TSX60, HXU (2x Bull), and HXD (2x Bear) 








Mean Deviations from Target Return Based on NAVs 
S&P/TSX Global Gold, HGU (2x Bull), and HGD (2x Bear) 








Mean Deviations from Target Return Based on NAVs 
S&P 500, SSO (2x Bull), and SDS (2x Bear) 
July 14, 2006 - December 31, 2009 
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Figure A-1 
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Figure A-2 
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